作者:Cui, ZW (Cui, Zhiwei)[ 1,2 ]
DYNAMIC GAMES AND APPLICATIONS
卷: 9期: 1
页: 47-67
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-018-0243-0
出版年: MAR 2019
文献类型:Article
摘要
This paper develops a coevolutionary model of social coordination and matching in which agents are embedded in an arbitrary fixed network and are matched in pairs to play a coordination game. In each period, based on payoff comparison with their neighbors, agents decide whether to imitate their neighbors' actions and whether to end their present partnerships. Inertia exists in action revision and partnership updating. Each agent can exit a partnership unilaterally. All separated agents are randomly matched in pairs at the beginning of the next period. Occasionally, agents make mistakes in action revision and partnership updating. When the size of the society is large, in the long run, all agents will play the Pareto-efficient action for a particular subset of networks.
关键词
作者关键词:Networks; Coordination game; Matching; Imitation; Coevolution
KeyWords Plus:STATISTICAL-MECHANICS; LOCAL INTERACTION; GAMES; EVOLUTION
作者信息
通讯作者地址:
Beihang University Beihang Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100191, Peoples R China.
Beihang University Beihang Univ, MoE Key Lab Complex Syst Anal & Management Decis, Beijing 100191, Peoples R China.
通讯作者地址: Cui, ZW (通讯作者)
